The evolution of research on monetary policy over the past two decades has been dramatic. The 1980s through the mid-1990s were dominated by work building on the insights of Kydland and Prescott, employing the notion of dynamic consistency to offer a theory of monetary policy, one in which discretionary policy by central banks led to socially costly inflation. Researchers studied the nature of the time inconsistency of monetary policy and developed solutions, ranging from appointing conservatives to developing incentive contracts, to imposing inflation targets. Whether central bankers learned, in the words of Ben McCallum to "just do it," or the nature of the incentives they faced changed, inflation was reduced in the industrialized economies during the 1980s and early 1990s. In the low inflation environment since, central banks have, in the eyes of many monetary economists, changed from a source of (often) politically induced inflation to maximizers of social welfare.
This shift has opened up new and productive collaborations between academic economists and central bank economists interested in issues of monetary policy design.
Much of this work builds on the basic foundations provided by the marriage of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, with their emphasis on optimizing behavior by economic agents and careful attention to budget constraints and equilibrium conditions, with simple models of price stickiness. Early contributors to these foundations include Yun (1996) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , and Goodfriend and King (1997) . The resulting framework for macroeconomic analysis, in its simplest form, boils down to an expectational IS curve, an inflation adjustment equation, and a specification of monetary policy in terms of either an objective function or a rule for setting the nominal rate of interest.
The research that has developed since these early papers has provided new insights into the transmission process of monetary policy, the objectives of stabilization policy, and the relationship between policy rules and the determinacy of equilibrium, to mention just a few of the topics that have been explored. Michael Woodford has been a major contributor in each of these areas, and in Interest and Prices: Foundations of a But the breadth of Woodford's contribution to recent developments in monetary economic is driven home by the publication of this work in a single volume.
Woodford makes contributions to the theory of price level determination under interest rate policies in cashless economies with flexible prices, to our understanding of the role of monetary policy in ensuring a determinate equilibrium, and to the design of optimal instrument rules. Every page is filled with nuanced discussions of special cases, exceptions, and extensions to the basic framework, and the approach to monetary economics and policy design is characterized by a consistency (down to the notation) that allows readers to sample easily from among the various chapters. The book will be an invaluable resource for academic and central bank researchers, as well as for graduate students in monetary economics. Interest and Prices is actually best viewed as a theory for monetary policy, rather than a theory of monetary policy. Woodford's purpose is not, for example, to explain why there were (widely viewed) policy failures in the 1970s. Instead, the treatise provides a manual for the design of optimal interest rate rules. Viewed as a policy manual, one can ask whether Interest and Prices actually does offer useful advice to policy makers. In many ways, it certainly does, most particularly in the approach it argues policy makers should use when thinking about policy design. But in other ways, as I will discuss, it is less clear how Woodford's approach can guide actual policy. To highlight these issues, I
will focus on two aspects of Woodford's contribution-the general Wicksellian approach to the monetary transmission process that he adopts and his approach to a rule-based theory of monetary policy.
The Wicksellian approach
In his 1898 treatise, Knut Wicksell outlined a theory of price level determination in which a key role was played by the relationship between the money rate of interest and the natural rate of interest.
1 In Woodford's approach, the natural real rate of interest is the rate associated with the absence of the nominal rigidities that account for short-run monetary non-neutralities, and the gap between the actual interest rate and the natural real rate represents the key channel through which central bank actions affect the economy. 
The nature of optimal rules
Woodford argues consistently for rule-based monetary policy, but rules of a specific sort. As is well known, in forward-looking models the standard solution to optimal policy under commitment, when the policy decision is taken at an initial time t 0 , sets the Lagrangian multipliers associated with past commitments to zero while simultaneously committing never to do so again. That is, there is an inherent time inconsistency in the initial period of the optimal commitment policy. This problem is common; in models of optimal seigniorage, it is efficient to engage in rapid inflation in the first period to tax existing holdings of money, while promising not to do so again.
Woodford argues instead for policy that is optimal from a "timeless perspective," a perspective that does not privilege period t 0 in any way. Under the timeless perspective, the Lagrangian multipliers associated with earlier commitments must be the same (time invariant) function of the predetermined and exogenous variables as the current and future multipliers are in the optimal commitment equilibrium. Heuristically, this requires that at time t 0 the central bank implement the policy that it would have found optimal to commit to if it had solved the optimal commitment policy at some earlier date. In doing so "the central bank is choosing to conform to a rule to which it should have wished to be expected to conform had the question been considered earlier without any restriction of this kind upon conduct at date t 0 ." (p. 539)
As McCallum and Nelson (2004) stress, economists have, since Lucas (1976) , focused on the behavior of economies under alternative policy regimes. That is, the assumption lying behind the standard rational expectations solution is that all agents have been behaving in systematic ways that allow rational expectations to be well defined and a stationary stochastic equilibrium to be obtained. Thus, the notion that the policy maker has been behaving in a manner that remains constant (not that the actions taken each period are the same but rather the decision rules are) is the most natural way to think of a commitment policy.
Less clear is the extent to which Woodford's policy recommendations can provide actual guidance to central banks that find themselves, for one reason or another, in a situation of high inflation and low credibility. There is little analysis of how such a central bank can best move from its current policy to an optimal commitment policy.
Policy evaluations are conducted assuming the private sector knows the central bank will honor its future commitments without fully discussing how this comes about. Ultimately, Woodford requires that central banks "just do it."
The advantage of commitment in forward-looking models comes from the ability of the central bank to affect the public's expectations of future interest rates. But the difficulty of doing so is illustrated by the Federal Reserve's recent attempts to signal its future intentions. By inserting the language "considerable period" into FOMC press releases during 2003, the Fed was attempting to let private agents know that interest rates would remain low for some time. However, as the Fed attempted in 2004 to modify its language about the future path of interest rates, it discovered that "fine-tuning" expectations is difficult. The central bank in Woodford's model is never faced with such problems. While he does examine the learnability of the rational expectations equilibrium, there is less discussion of the potential short-run costs of adopting the optimal commitment policy. In a sense, the focus is on situations in which a central bank has already achieved low and stable inflation and now is concerned with fine-tuning its optimal rule.
Woodford's analysis deals with situations in which the principle of certainty equivalence applies. Policy rule that are robust to misspecification of the exogenous error processes are considered, but more fundamental and important sources of uncertainty are not dealt with. As Levin and Williams (2003) demonstrate, the optimal policy rules Woodford proposes may produce very bad outcomes if the model on which they are based turns out to be wrong or if the central bank employs parameter estimates that are incorrect. This argues for viewing the approach to policy that Woodford develops as an important starting point for further research that will investigate the manner in which these rules must be modified to address the uncertainty about the economy's structure that policy makers confront in practice.
Integrating theory and policy
Perhaps the most important contribution of Woodford's work is his successful integration of monetary policy analysis with welfare economics. While this has been done previously (e.g., Friedman 1969), the earlier literature focused on inflation as a tax, integrating it into the more general Ramsey approach to optimal taxation. While important, this work appeared to have little to say about the types of macroeconomic stabilization issues that occupy the attention of most central bankers and many monetary economists.
What Woodford has shown is that maximizing the welfare of the representative agent can also provide a framework for evaluating and designing stabilization policies.
And, as he emphasizes, his approach provides strong support for price stability as an outcome of optimal policy. Whether the distortions that are central to this approach (i.e., relative price dispersion generated by nominal rigidities) will ultimately turn out to be those most relevant for the design of stabilization policies remains an open question.
Woodford closes his treatise by saying "It is hoped that the present study will help to stimulate further work in this sphere and, in so doing, reveal as a practical possibility the sort of rational management of national standards of value that could only be dreamed of by the monetary reforms of a century ago." (p. 623). His work has already stimulated a great deal of interesting research; whether it will live up to the promise contained in the final sentence remains to be seen. What is already clear, though, is that Interest and Prices is a major contribution to monetary economics. 
